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I. INTRODUCTION
As we move forward into a new millennium, a large number of Americans,
especially senior citizens or those without insurance, will find it increasingly difficult
to obtain prescription drugs because of rising prices. International price increases
have had the most severe consequences in third world countries where sixty percent
of the population does not have regular access to essential drugs.1 While this paper
focuses on domestic prescription drug prices, many analogies may be drawn between
the problems created by high prescription drug prices in the United States and those
in third world countries.
Many have attributed rising prescription drug prices to the laissez-faire attitude
of the U.S. federal government. As a result, Congress has introduced new proposals
to combat both these criticisms and prices. Many of these proposals reduce the
amount of protection granted to a patent holder of a newly developed prescription
drug. Large pharmaceutical companies are lobbying against these proposals,
claiming that implementing such “price controls” will hinder the research and
development of new and important drugs.2 They argue that the patent protection
offered to pharmaceutical companies allows them to recoup and profit from their
monetary investments on recently introduced drugs, and in turn, allows them to
produce new essential drugs.3 Using this argument as a catalyst, the pharmaceutical

1
Website of Essential Information, A Healthy Drug Policy for the Third World, at
http://www.essential.org/monitor/hyper/issues/1992/12/mm1292_09.htm (website expired).
2

Carl B. Feldbaum, Loosening Patent Protection Hurts Drug Companies, PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 17, 1999, at 4G.
3

Id.
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industry has pushed for the adoption of a style patent protection regime
internationally.4 Ultimately, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA)
of the U.S. appealed successfully to the government to take retaliatory trade
measures against third world countries that did not change existing national
legislation, which provided no protection to pharmaceutical products.5
High prescription drug prices must be reduced through a proposal that allows
new drugs to be more accessible and affordable to those who need them, while
maintaining the drug companies’ ability to profit and reinvest in new essential drugs.
This article will discuss a recently proposed bill, The Affordable Prescription
Drugs Act (APDA),6 and how it will attempt to strike a balance between reducing
prices to make essential drugs more available and affordable, and working with
pharmaceutical companies to make sure they profit and reinvest their money into
research and development of new essential drugs. It argues that the APDA increases
competition in the market place, thus reducing the price of prescription drugs, while
still allowing pharmaceutical companies to profit from their inventions. In reaching
this conclusion this article examines the bill itself, how to define an essential drug,
whether current prices are fair, Congress’ attitude towards these prices, the drug
industry’s justifications for high prices, and presents a rebuttal argument against
those justifications.
II. THE AFFORDABLE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ACT
Representative Sherrod Brown7 introduced APDA in the House of
Representatives on September 23, 1999.8 The bill favors “good old fashioned
American competition” by reducing the amount of patent protection granted to
pharmaceutical companies.9 The APDA would allow the government to force price
competition for drugs that provide a substantial health benefit, but carry an excessive
price tag.10 It would accomplish this by issuing a compulsory license to a drug

4
Website of Essential Information, supra note 1 (“It is only the pharmaceutical industry
that has been trying to force the entire world to adopt U.S. style patent laws.”)
5
Id. (stating that the PMA has been successful in getting Third World countries such as
Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Thailand and Venezuela to change their patent laws
to resemble those of the United States).
6

H.R. 2927, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).

7

Sherrod Brown is an Ohio Democrat currently serving his fourth term as Representative
of Ohio’s 13th Congressional District; he is the ranking member of the House Commerce
Committee’s
Health
and
Environment
Subcommittee,
at
http://www.house.
gov/sherrodbrown/bionew.htm.
8

H.R. 2927, supra note 6.

9

National Journal, American Health Line, Medicare RX: House Committee Navigates
Crowded Field, Oct. 5, 1999, § Politics and Policy, at http://nationaljournal.com/ cgibin/ifetch4?ENG+AMERICAN_HEALTHLINE+7-ahlindex+1052542-REVERSE+0+0+
26178+F+1+1+rx%&3a+AND+house+AND+navigates+AND+crowded+AND+field+AND+
PD%2f10%2f05%2f1999%2d%3e10%2f05%2f1999.
10

National Journal, American Health Line, Prescription Drugs: Two More Bills Would
Lower Costs, Sept. 24, 1999, § Politics and Policy, at http://nationaljournal.com/ cgibin/ifetch4?ENG+AMERICAN_HEALTHLINE-_-POLL_TRACK-_-AD_SPOT LIGHT+7-
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manufacturer to produce a generic version of a brand name drug which is still
protected under patent.11
Certain steps must be taken and requirements met before a compulsory license is
granted. The bill requires three important elements to be satisfied. First, the
Secretary of Health must determine “[s]uch compulsory license is necessary to
alleviate health or safety needs which are not adequately satisfied by the patent
holder, contractor, licensee, or assignee.”12 This first element determines whether
the drug should be considered essential or non-essential. If the drug has been
determined to be essential or one that provides a “substantial health benefit,” the first
requirement has been met.13
The second element requires, “[t]he patented material is priced higher than may
be reasonably expected based on criteria developed by the Secretary of
Commerce.”14 This determines whether a drug’s price is so excessive that it bears no
semblance to pricing norms for other industries.15 To help make this determination
drug companies would be required to provide audited, detailed information on the
expenses accumulated while developing the drug.16 Companies that fail to disclose
such information would be ineligible to participate in federal health care programs.17
After this information has been gathered and analyzed, if the selling price of the drug
is determined to be “exorbitantly costly,” the bill’s second element has been met.18
The third and final element states: “The patent holder, contractor, licensee, or
assignee . . . has not taken or is not expected to take within a reasonable time,
effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention in a field of
use.”19 This element functions as an “escape clause,” allowing the drug company to
work with the government in voluntarily lowering prices.20 Thus, many drug
companies could avoid a compulsory license if they decide to voluntarily lower their
prices below an excessive price rate as determined by the Secretary of Commerce.
If these elements are satisfied it will be determined that a compulsory license is
necessary to reduce the price of the drug to make it more accessible and affordable to
those who need it. A generic manufacturer would then be granted a compulsory
license to manufacture the drug while it is still under patent protection.21 During the
ahlindex+1021382_REVERSE+0+0+-1+F+9+13+1+prescription+AND+drugs
%3atAND+two+AND+more+AND+bills+AND+WDuld+AND+lower+AND+costs.
11

Medicare RX: House Committee Navigates Crowded Field, supra note 9.

12

H.R. 2927, supra note 6.

13

Prescription Drugs: Two More Bills Would Lower Costs, supra note 10.

14

H.R. 2927, supra note 6.

15

106 CONG. REC. H10754 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1999) (statement of Rep. Brown).

16

Id.

17

Prescription Drugs: Two More Bills Would Lower Costs, supra note 10.

18

Medicare RX: House Committee Navigates Crowded Field, supra note 9.

19

H.R. 2927, supra note 6.

20

106 CONG. REC. H10754, supra note 15.

21

Medicare RX: House Committee Navigates Crowded Field, supra note 9.
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period that the generic drug is on the market, the generic manufacturer would pay
royalties to the original manufacturer.22 These royalties would help “amply reward”
the patent holder for being the first on the market, while “Americans would benefit
from competitively driven prices.”23
It is important to note that the APDA does not use price controls to reduce
prescription drug prices.24 Instead, the bill reduces drug industry monopoly power,
while increasing consumer buying power by subjecting the drug industry to marketdriven competitive forces.25 The bill is a means of moderating prices that are too
high without inadvertently setting prices too low.
III. HOW TO DEFINE AN ESSENTIAL DRUG AND EXCESSIVE PRICING
An important and difficult element to determine is whether a drug should be
considered essential. Most would agree that life-saving drugs should be considered
essential. However, there are many drugs that fall into a gray area, such as the antidepressant Prozac whose determination as an essential drug will be difficult.
The difficulty of this determination is compounded by the fact “that there is no
established systematic process, either in our regulatory or medical structures, to
establish criteria for identifying and prioritizing the most important drugs.…”26 So
how will the Secretary of Health determine whether a drug is essential or nonessential? Some possible criteria include the volume of use of the drug, the number
of people the drug will impact, the severity of the condition for which the drug is
prescribed, or if the drug is used only to treat a life-threatening condition.27
Such criteria lead to an array of difficult choices in determining what is an
essential drug. For example, proponents of treatments for rare life-threatening
diseases view certain drugs as essential, even though these drugs may ultimately be
used on a relatively small amount of the general population.28 In contrast, drugs used
to treat medical conditions such as ulcers, while not a life-threatening disease, would
be more widely prescribed and impact a larger portion of the population.29
Determining how an essential drug is defined is a complex issue. Yet,
developing a definition and process for identifying essential drugs is imperative for
the success of the APDA. Possible models that can be examined in order to
determine whether a drug is essential or non-essential are those used by many third
world countries that have already produced an essential drug list.30 According to the
22

Prescription Drugs: Two More Bills Would Lower Costs, supra note 10.

23

106 CONG. REC. H10754, supra note 15.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Jeffrey L. Blumer, Essential Drugs for Infants and Children: North American
Perspective, PEDIATRICS, Sept. 1999, at 603.
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Michael R. Reich, The Global Drug Gap, SCIENCE, Mar. 17, 2000, available at http//:
www.biotech-info.net/drug_gap.html.
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World Health Organization (WHO), more than sixty countries have operationalized
essential drug programs, with thirty more in the process of drafting such programs.31
These essential drug lists were initiated in poorer countries in order to ensure a
reasonable level of health care for as many people as possible.32
The WHO has been a large promoter of the concept of essential drugs “to
advance health equity through expanded access to basic medicines for poor people in
poor countries.”33 Currently, the WHO’s Tenth Model list of essential drugs
contains 306 active drugs.34 Such a list allows a country to focus its efforts on
supplying the most important drugs to a population that is unable to gain access to
them.
Experts have argued that using the WHO’s Model List as a basis will prove to be
largely ineffective “[b]ecause of the great differences between countries, the
preparation of a drug list of uniform, general applicability is not feasible or possible.
Therefore each country has the direct responsibility of evaluating and adopting a list
of essential drugs, according to its own policy in the field of health.”35 This
argument is countered by recent studies of various essential drug lists from different
countries, which have shown surprisingly small variations of drugs determined to be
essential.36 The theory behind this lack of diversity is that diseases normally
transcend national boundaries in symptoms and cures.37
While an essential drug list developed in America should be broadly based on the
WHO’s Eleventh Model List, it should also incorporate the specific criteria that will
make it more suited to the economic and medical needs of Americans.
Another problematic element is the determination of when a drug’s price should
be considered excessive. This requirement poses the problem of determining what
financial statistics are relevant. The drug industry will inevitably argue that the cost
of research and development of drugs that failed to reach the market should be
included in this calculation. The industry argues that “[o]f every 5,000 medicines
tested, on average, only five are tested in clinical trials and only one of those is
approved for patient use. Revenues from successful medicines must cover the costs
of the dry holes.”38 Furthermore, only three of every ten prescription drugs available
in America generates revenues that meet or exceed average research and

31

Dzulkifli Abdu Razak & Pusat Racun Negara, National Essential Drug List Hailed, NEW
STRAITS TIMES, (Mar. 2, 1996) at 11, at http://www.prn.usm.my/edl/nedl.html.
32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Razak, supra note 31.

37

Id.

38

PhRMA,
Why
Do
Medicines
Phrma.org/publications/brochure/questions/.

Cost

So

Much?

at

http://www.

150

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 16:145

development costs.39 The industry average for bringing just one new medicine to the
market is $500 million.40
To determine what is an excessive price, the Secretary of Commerce most
accurately determine how much was spent to develop the drug. As will be discussed
later, a complication in determining the amount spent on a new drug is that a large
portion of research and development costs are not paid by the pharmaceutical
industry. Thus, for an accurate determination of an excessive price only those
research and development expenditures paid by the company should be considered
relevant.
IV. THE RISING COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
Soaring drug prices represent a health crisis that is sweeping this nation.41
Currently, the prices of prescription drugs are rising twice as fast as the inflation
rate.42 Hardest hit by these price increases are senior citizens and the uninsured.
Recent statistics indicate “[a] third of all seniors, over 10 million seniors, lack drug
coverage; millions more are barely insured; employers are dropping their retiree
coverage and private health insurers are cutting back their prescription drug
benefits.”43 Since senior citizens consume one-third of all prescriptions and many
live on low fixed incomes, such actions have made them the most vulnerable
segment of the American population to rising prescription drug prices.44
Much like senior citizens, those without insurance coverage have also found it
difficult to obtain much needed prescription drugs. Uninsured families are often
charged two or three times more for prescription drugs than those who are insured.45
The pharmaceutical industry agrees with these figures stating that private insurance
companies pay drug prices thirty to thirty-nine percent lower than those charged to
individuals without prescription drug insurance.46 Higher costs for the uninsured are
attributed to the uninsured having no one to negotiate lower prices on their behalf.47
In both instances higher drug prices have lead to many difficult decisions for
those who cannot afford them. People are making decisions that put their health in
jeopardy, often choosing between purchasing food and purchasing medicine for
themselves or their families.48 A seventy-one-year-old widow from Sheffield Lake,
Ohio, reported that since United Health Care pulled out of her county she has little

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

John Freeman, Cutting Drug Prices and Saving Lives, METRO TIMES, July 5, 2000,
available at http://www.metrotimes.com/20/40/features/newcutting.htm.
42

Id.

43

146 CONG. REC. H1127 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Brown).

44

Freeman, supra note 41.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.
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drug coverage left.49 The coverage she does have is absorbed by just one of her
medications.50 This seventy-one-year-old woman was forced to take a part time job
in order to subsidize her low fixed income and help pay for her prescription drugs. A
seventy-six-year-old woman from Elyria, Ohio stated, “I desperately need
prescription drug help. Up until two weeks ago I worked three jobs, now I am
working two jobs. Without working I can not [sic] afford to live. I don’t know how
much longer I will be able to work.”51 The elderly are not the only group feeling the
effects of high prescription drug prices. The middle-aged also have found it difficult
to afford prescription drugs as reported by a man from Medina, Ohio: “Not only
does [sic] high prescription (prices) affect senior citizens (but it also affects the)
middle-age as well. When you take (into account) maintenance medication (i.e. [sic]
high blood pressure, estrogen replacement, … etc.) the cost effects us too. [A]
decision has to be made – Do you eat or buy medication?”52
On a larger international scale, citizens of third world countries face severe
consequences because of accessibility problems, and mirror many of the dilemmas
faced by America’s senior citizens and uninsured. An example of this is the AIDS
epidemic in Africa and the excessive price of the drug AZT. As the AIDS epidemic
continues to rage out of control in Africa, families that must care for a member
infected with the virus often deplete monetary resources, which would otherwise be
used for necessities, such as healthy food, or as an investment in their children’s
futures.53
V. ARE CURRENT PRICES FAIR?
This leads us to the question of whether current drug prices are fair?54
Comparisons of prescription drug prices in other industrialized nations and prices for
veterinary medicines, with average prices Americans pay demonstrate they are not.
A recent survey shows that on average U.S. citizens are charged 205 percent
more than their Canadian neighbors for the same prescription drugs.55 For example,
the medication Cipro, which is used to treat infections, has an average wholesale
price of $171.59 in Canada.56 The same medication sold in the U.S., by the same
manufacturer, in the same dosage and quantity of pills, has a wholesale price of
$399.63, which represents a 233 percent increase from the Canadian price.57 Other
49
Statement of Representative Sherrod Brown, The Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, at
http://www.house.gov.sherrodbrown/afpda.htm.
50

Representative Sherrod Brown, Prescription Drug Stories From Seniors, at
http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/rxstories.htm.
51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Website of CNN, AIDS Leaves Africa’s Economic Future
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/aids/stories/economic.impact.htm.

in

Doubt,

at

Pain,

at

54

146 CONG. REC. H1127, supra note 43.

55

Senator
Byron
Dorgan,
Rising
Drug
http//www.senate.gov/~dorgan/prescriptioncosts.htm1.
56

Id.

57

Id.

Costs

are

a
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examples of such price discrepancies include Zocor, a cholesterol reducing
medication, and Tamoxifen, which is used to treat breast cancer. In Canada, sixty
tablets of Zocor costs $44; in the U.S. the same dosage of Zocor costs $102.58
Remarkably, a month supply of Tamoxifen sells for $156 in the U.S. and only $12 in
Canada.59 Not only do these discrepancies exist between Canada and the U.S., they
also exist between the U.S. and other industrialized nations such as Germany,
Sweden, United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Italy.60
Why are the U.S. drug prices disproportionate when compared to other
industrialized nations? It is because the U.S. does not demand that drug
manufacturers reduce their prices.61 Instead of using the collective purchasing power
of thirty-eight million senior citizens to demand fairly priced drugs, the U.S. simply
retreats when drug manufacturers warn that any such action may stifle research and
development of new drugs.62
A comparison of medicines used by both animals and humans also demonstrates
that current drug prices are unequal and inherently unfair. Manufacturers charge an
average of 106 percent to 151 percent more for prescription drugs used by humans
compared to the price of the same drug when used by animals.63 A recent study
shows that a group of drugs manufactured by the same company in the same dosage
and form, used by both people and pets, costs on average 131 percent more when the
drug is intended for human rather than animal use.64
A good example of the price disparity between veterinary medicines and human
medicines is the price of the drug Lanoxin, used in the treatment of heart failure.65 A
human purchasing Lanoxin will pay $25.65, however, make that exact same
purchase, in the same dosage and form for your pet and you only pay $6.36.66
Another example of these price differentials can be found in the frequently
prescribed antibiotic Augmentin.67 A manufacturer selling Augmentin for animal
use charges $18.00 for a one-month supply.68 When the same manufacturer sells a
one-month supply of the drug for human consumption the price skyrockets to
58

145 CONG. REC. H11148 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1999) (statement of Rep. Brown).

59

Id.

60

For every U.S. dollar spent on prescription drugs on average Germany only pays
seventy-one cents, Sweden sixty-eight cents, U.K. sixty-five cents, Canada sixty-four cents,
France fifty-seven cents, and Italy fifty-one cents, Dorgan, supra note 55.
61

146 Cong. Rec. H1127, supra note 43.

62

Id.

63

Website of Sherrod Brown, Study Shows that Drug Manufacturers’ Prices are More that
Double for Humans than for Animals, available at http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/
drugm31.htm.
64

Id.

65

Freeman, supra note 41.

66

Id.

67

Study Shows that Drug Manufacturers’ Prices are More that Double for Humans than
for Animals, supra note 63.
68

Id.
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$56.40.69 By subtracting the manufacturer’s price increase paid by humans for
popular drugs such as these, consumers would pay an average of 25 percent to 38
percent less at the pharmacy per year.
The pharmaceutical industry attempts to explain this discrepancy by reasoning
that veterinary drug prices cost less because of lower research and development
costs, and less restrictive testing standards that are less restrictive which lead to less
expensive production costs.70 However, lower research and development costs do
not justify the cost discrepancies. As stated by Dr. Alan Sager, an industry expert:
“The observed price differences cannot be explained by differences in research costs.
Research is a fixed or sunk cost. Manufacturers do not set their prices based on
recovery of these costs. Instead, they set their prices as high as possible in order to
maximize revenue and profit.”71 Higher production costs due to more restrictive
safety standards also fails to account for these price differentials. The Food and
Drug Administration’s (FDA) “good manufacturing practice requirements,” codified
in 21 C.F.R. part 211, which are designed to ensure drug quality and consistency, are
applied to both human and animal drugs.72 According to the FDA, “The methods,
facilities, and controls under which animal drugs are manufactured, processed,
packaged, or held for sale must conform to the requirements of the regulations for
Current Good Manufacturing Practices in the drug industry generally.”73
These price differentials demonstrate the price-gouging attitude of many large
pharmaceutical companies. The vulnerability of today’s U.S. senior citizens and
uninsured has allowed these companies to place the burden of paying high prices for
necessary drugs on these segments of the U.S. public. The continuation of such a
burden will no doubt result in an elderly society saturated with sickness, and without
the ability to pay for drugs that will help.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH
While drug prices continue to increase to the point where millions of U.S.
citizens cannot afford the high costs of prescription drugs, the majority in Congress
refuses to take action to help reduce these prices.74 This laizze-faire attitude that
Congress has taken can be attributed to the drug industry’s lobbying power and
constant threat that money for “research and development will dry up.”75

69

Id.

70
PhRMA, Prescription Drugs: Are Fido and Fluffy Getting a Better Deal?, at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/documents/backgrounders/2000.phtm.
71

Representative Elijah E. Cummings, Prescription Drug Price Discrimination: Drug
Manufacturer Prices Are Higher for Humans than for Animals, at http://www.house.gov/
cummings/drugrpt3/comprpt8.htm.
72

Id.

73

Id.

74

145 CONG. REC. H10754 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2000) (statement of Rep. Brown).

75

Representative Sherrod Brow, Statement at House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment
Hearing
(Sept.
28,
1999),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/medpresdrg 920.htm.
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Even when Congress has taken action against high drug prices, strong lobbying
by the drug industry has led to watered down measures. An excellent example is the
recently approved Agriculture Appropriations Conference Report.76 Originally, this
legislation would have established drug re-importation from other countries by
eliminating a federal law that gives manufacturers a monopoly over drug imports.77
It ultimately would have allowed the same drugs that are being sold at a lower price
in countries such as Canada to be brought back into the U.S. and sold at a lower price
here.78 In order to fight off these measures, the pharmaceutical industry spent
millions of dollars on television, radio and newspaper ads in an attempt to expunge
the provisions during committee meetings.79 This effort by the pharmaceutical
industry led to a final law, which included language filled with various
pharmaceutical industry backed loopholes, making the provisions largely
ineffective.80 “Specifically the provisions limit where prescription drugs can be
imported from, allows the pharmaceutical industry to force foreign wholesalers to
sell products at the inflated American price, and revokes the bill after five years.”81
Another excellent example of Congress’ reluctance to take action against
prescription drug prices is the recently proposed “Sanders Amendment.”82 The
Sanders Amendment was proposed specifically in order to enforce the already
existing Bayh-Dole provisions, which require the reasonable pricing of prescription
drugs.83 The mere fact that Congress must attempt to enact legislation in order to
enforce already existing legislation to lower drug prices leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the pharmaceutical industries lobbying power has succeeded.
VII. CONGRESSIONAL EXTENSIONS OF PATENT PROTECTION
Not only has the majority of Congress opposed new laws which would help
reduce the price of prescription drugs, but they have also passed legislation to extend
the length of patent protection granted to these drugs. The pharmaceutical industry
gained a major extension in its patent term when Congress enacted the Patent Term
Extension to the Waxman-Hatch Act.84 Section 155 of the Act states, “the term of a
patent . . . shall be extended if such composition or process has been subjected to a
regulatory review by the Federal Food and Drug Administration pursuant to the

76
Representative Sherrod Brown, Brown: The Gop Forsakes Seniors for Drug Companies,
at http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/drugo11.html.
77

Id.

78

Asad Jaleel, Congress Finally Acts to Cover Prescription Price, JOURNAL FOR PRE
HEALTH AFFILIATED STUDENTS, available at http://icaius.cc.uic.edu/orgs/jphas/fall2001/
invitedopinion_ol.html.
79

Brown: The Gop Forsakes Seniors for Drug Companies, supra note 76.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

35 U.S.C. §155 (2001).
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Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.”85 Section 155 effectively allowed the drug
industry to gain up to five years of added protection for any drug subjected to the
FDA’s regulatory procedures.86 The pharmaceutical industry has taken full
advantage of this provision extending patent protection and higher prices of many
important prescription drugs.87
Once again in 1995, many pharmaceutical companies gained an extension on
their patents. Pharmaceutical companies benefited from a ruling on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which extended many prescription drug patents
from seventeen years to twenty years.88 This ruling allowed prescription drugs such
as Zantac, an ulcer medication, whose patent protection was about to expire, to reap
the monopolistic benefits of patent protection for three more years.89 According to
the Prime Institute at the University of Minnesota, an institution that does research
on pharmaceutical economics and public policy issues, this extension has cost
consumers an extra 6.2 billion dollars in spending on prescription drugs.90
Another recent attempt by Congress to extend the patent protection of
prescription drugs occurred in 1998. A proposed rider to the 1998 Agriculture
Appropriations bill would have allowed manufacturers of seven prescription drugs to
petition the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for additional patent term extensions
beyond those allowed by the Hatch-Waxman Act.91 One drug that would have
benefited from this extension was the top anti-arthritis drug Relafen that had already
grossed sales of $419 million.92 The availability of a generic version of Relafen
would save consumers $268 to $535 a year while total annual savings to all health
care payers would range from $126 million to $252 million.93 Fortunately, for senior
citizens, the rider did not go through; however, this is an excellent example of how
costly a “second bite at the patent apple” can be for seniors citizens on a fixed
income.94
VIII. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES EXTEND PATENT PROTECTION
Despite Congressional patent extensions, pharmaceutical companies have used
unscrupulous methods to unfairly extend their drug patents in order to reap the
benefits of a patent monopoly. One method used by large pharmaceutical companies
85

Id.

86

Franklin Pierce Law Center’s
ipcorner//bp97/eval2.htm#Returnto 23.

“IP

Mall,”

at

http://www.ipmall.fplc.edu/

87

Id.

88
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to extend their patent protection is to keep generic drugs from the market by paying
off manufacturers to refrain from producing the generic version for a limited time.95
In FTC v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,96 a large pharmaceutical company,
Hoechst, attempted to delay the introduction of a generic version of the brand name
hypertension and angina drug, Cardizem CD, that they produce.97 Hoechst and
Andrx, generic drug manufacturers, entered into an agreement in which Hoechst
agreed to pay Andrx millions of dollars, and in return Andrx would not enter the
market with the generic version of the drug during the term of the agreement.98
Another similar conspiracy involved Abbott and Geneva Laboratories. Abbott
Laboratories develops, manufactures and sells a variety of health care products and
services including a drug called Hytrin, which is used to treat two chronic conditions
that affect millions of Americans, particularly senior citizens, high blood pressure
and enlarged prostate.99 Abbott Laboratories conspired with Geneva, one of the
leading generic drug manufacturers in the U.S., to delay the sale of a generic version
of Hytrin, terazosin HCL.100 The agreement between Abbott and Geneva was that
Abbott would pay Geneva $4.5 million dollars per month and in return Geneva
would not offer HCL in competition with Hytrin for a limited time.101 “Without a
lower-priced generic alternative, consumers, government agencies, health plans,
pharmacies, hospitals, wholesalers, and others were forced to purchase Abbott’s
more expensive Hytrin product.”102
Such conspiracies are in direct conflict with the Hatch-Waxman Act, which
facilitates the entry of generic drugs into the market while maintaining incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to invest in new drugs.103 These conspiracies have a
direct and substantial effect on consumer savings.104 The entry of generic drugs into
the market plays a key role in lowering prices of prescription drugs. Generic drugs
usually have an immediate impact on the market place; pharmacists generally select
lower priced drugs for their brand name substitute, and third party payers of
prescription drugs, such as Medicaid programs, encourage or insist upon the use of
95
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generic drugs.105 Studies have shown that generic drugs sell for thirty to sixty
percent less than brand name drugs.106 Furthermore, estimates by the Congressional
Budget Office Report have shown that lower prices from generic drugs have saved
consumers $8-10 billion per year on prescriptions at retail pharmacies.107
Pharmaceutical companies have also unfairly extended their patent protection by
double patenting the same drug. In order for a company to acquire a drug patent the
PTO must find its claim to be novel, useful, and non-obvious.108 As a result, if a
company attempts to extend a patent of an existing patented drug by bringing in a
new claim for a drug patent that is similar to the already patented drug, the claim
should fail because of obviousness.109 To simplify, by claiming a second invention,
the pharmaceutical company is simply looking to extend the underlying first patent.
Such attempted extensions of patent protection by pharmaceutical companies are
illegal under the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.110 “The doctrine of
obviousness-type double patenting prohibits a party from securing an unjustified
extension of its exclusive rights through claims in a later patent that are not
patentably distinct from earlier claims.”111 Obviousness-type double patenting
requires the court to take a two-step analysis.112 First, the court must determine
whether the second claim encompasses the subject matter of the first claim.113
Second, the court must determine if the second claim is patentably distinct from
earlier claims.114
In Eli Lilly Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,115 the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that Barr Laboratories’ attempt to manufacture a generic version of
Prozac did not infringe upon an existing Eli Lilly patent because of obviousness-type
double patenting.116 In 1977, Eli Lilly patented claim ‘895 for the marketing of
fluoxetine hydrochloride to be used as an anti-depressant in humans.117 This patent
was set to expire in 1994.118 In 1984, Eli Lilly patented claim ‘549 for the marketing
105
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of flouxetine hydrochloride to be used in the treatment of serotonin uptake in
animals.119 This patent was set to expire in 2003.120 In 1995, Barr Laboratories filed
an Abbreviated New Drug Application under the Hatch-Waxman Act to market
fluoxetine hydrochloride as an anti-depressant. On April 10, 1996 Eli Lilly brought
an infringement action against Barr for infringement of claim ‘549, which had yet to
expire.121
Applying the two-step analysis, the Federal Circuit first determined that the later
claim encompassed the same subject matter of the previous claim.122 The court then
attempted to determine “whether the differences in subject matter between the two
claims are patentably distinct.”123 The court found that the only discernible
difference between the two patents was that the earlier patent addressed the treatment
of depression in humans while the later patent addressed the treatment of serotonin
uptake in animals.124 Relying upon previous case law, the Federal Circuit held that
the use of fluoxetine hydrochloride in two different species was not enough to make
the two separate claims patentably distinct.125
Generic drug manufacturers have also played a role in keeping prescription drug
prices high. In a case that was scheduled to be ready for trial early this year, Mylan
Laboratories, the second largest U.S. generic drug manufacturer, was accused of
cornering the market on raw materials for two popular drugs lorazepam and
chlorazepate.126 Mylan attempted to restrain competition from other generic drug
manufacturers by acquiring exclusive licensing arrangements for the supply of the
raw materials necessary to produce both of the generic drugs, thereby allowing
Mylan laboratories to dramatically increase the price of both lorazepam and
chlorazepate.127 Mylan Laboratories has agreed to pay $147 million in order to settle
these charges.128
Such actions taken by the pharmaceutical industry increases the amount of patent
protection beyond the limits deemed appropriate by Congress.
These
patent/monopoly extensions have had and will continue to have a detrimental effect
on the accessibility and affordability of prescription drugs. By the time of patent
expiration, United States consumers have more than compensated the drug industry
for its innovative expenditures, and are being cheated out of lower priced generic
drugs by the unscrupulous patent extensions of a spoiled industry.
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IX. DRUG INDUSTRY’S JUSTIFICATION FOR HIGHER PRICES
Repeatedly, drug companies have made the same threat: “If you don’t leave drug
prices alone, we won’t produce any new drugs.”129 They argue that any type of
action taken by the government to reduce the price of prescription drugs will
inevitably lead to a decrease in the profits necessary to fund research and
development of new life-saving drugs.130 This threat has not only led to a reluctance
on the part of the government to interject regulatory policies, but it has also made
many essential prescription drugs unavailable to the elderly and uninsured.
Many pharmaceutical companies have taken up arms against the APDA in an
effort to keep the bill from becoming a law. They have projected that research-based
pharmaceutical companies will invest an estimated $24 billion dollars in research
and development of new medicines.131 They argue that the APDA will be
detrimental to any hope for new cures, and will jeopardize the current development
of new drugs by forcing companies to reduce their patent protection to new break
through drugs.132 Alan F. Homer President of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhMRA”) has stated:
We couldn’t keep up the current, pro-patient research momentum if
Representative Brown’s bill were enacted into law. More investment
dollars instead would flow to other products that have intellectual
property protection, instead of to medicines. If we want to continue the
remarkable strides in health, we need to keep strong intellectual property
protection for medicines in place.133
Domestic biotechnology companies are also investing large amounts of money to
lobby against the APDA. The U.S. biotechnology industry leads the world in healthcare innovation.134 These cutting edge companies are developing drugs for many
debilitating illnesses, such as Alzheimer’s disease, various cancers and heart
disease.135 Many biotechnology companies argue that patents provide a limited
amount of market protection from competitors, and this protection gives these
innovative companies the opportunity to recoup their enormous investments in new
drugs. Furthermore, they argue that without patent protection private investors have
no incentive for risking their capital.136
Carl B. Feldbaum, President of Biotechnology Industry Organization, has taken a
strong opposition against the APDA, and any other regulatory action that will reduce
129
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the price of drugs. In a recent interview, Feldbaum stated “we will aggressively
oppose any legislation that undermines innovation through either overt or covert
disguised government imposed drug price controls. Anything that artificially lowers
reimbursement rates and keeps our companies from bringing new drugs to market
and to patients.”137 Feldbaum points to the record twenty-one drugs produced by
biotech companies and approved by the FDA in 1998.138 He argues that biotech
companies, that produce new innovative drugs, could not have done so under a
system of regulatory price controls.139 Speaking specifically of the APDA, Feldbaum
stated, “[i]nstead of helping seniors and other patients, Brown’s legislation clearly
would hurt them by impeding new drug development. Many biotech drugs and
vaccines under development are aimed at diseases, such as Alzheimer’s, where no
treatments are available.”140 Biotech industry representatives are quick to note the
majority of their drugs are still in the research stage, and their continued
development relies upon the venture capital obtained by drugs already on the
market.141
Pharmaceutical companies also argue that higher prices are justified since today’s
drugs do considerably more than drugs from the past.142 Examples include recently
introduced drugs that reduce cholesterol, lower blood pressure, treat depression,
battle cancer, and improve patients’ quality of life.143 The drug industry explains that
not only do prescription drugs offer the most ideal therapeutic option, they are also
the most feasible economic alternatives.144 An example of the possible economic
benefits of prescription drugs are the cost savings of purchasing new prescription
drugs compared to patient hospitalization. One week of hospitalization in the U.S.
for a patient with schizophrenia costs nearly the same as a full year of treatment with
a newer antipsychotic drug, such as Zyprexa.145
However, the fact that a drug offers additional benefits cannot be a viable
economic rationale for higher drug prices. The only justifiable argument for higher
prices is recoupment of research and development costs, not the public benefit that a
drug affords.
The drug industry proclaims that the best way to ensure the accessibility of new
drugs is to avoid governmental price controls and focus more on adopting a
Medicare modernization position.146 Such a position would allow drug companies to
137
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continue to charge monopolistic prices, while, allegedly, making prescription drugs
more available and affordable to the public.
X. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
The drug industry’s threat that any action by the government to reduce
prescription drug prices would ultimately decrease the industry’s ability to create
new drugs has been very effective. However, consumers and Congress should be
wary of the truth behind such a threat.
While research and development of new drugs is as important to health care as
availability and lower prices, the pharmaceutical industries threat has no merit when
we determine who really pays for the research and development of new drugs. What
the drug industry does not reveal is that they do not bear the major burden of funding
research and development of new drugs.147 Presently, the federal government funds
all of the basic research and development of new drugs through the National
Institutes of Health (NIH).148 In fact, through the NIH, U.S. taxpayers finance 42
percent of the research and development that produces new drugs.149 Furthermore,
private foundations, state and local governments, and other non-industry sources
represent eleven percent of the funding for research and development of new
drugs.150 The pharmaceutical companies are usually only involved in funding the
clinical testing of new compounds for safety and effectiveness in order to gain
regulatory approval for applications of the new drug.151 “The NIH and independent
scientists working with NIH grants, generally do the hard part and take the biggest
risks, yet there is no system for sharing the drug companies’ subsequent profits with
the public treasury or for setting moderate prices that don’t gouge consumers.”152
Furthermore, the drug industry’s threat that research and development of new
drugs will be chilled by any actions taken to lower prescription drug prices is less
effective when we examine the large tax breaks given to pharmaceutical companies
for their research and development expenditures. Congress bestowed these generous
tax breaks upon drug companies in order to give them an incentive to invest more of
their time and effort into the research and development of new essential drugs.153
The tax breaks are enormous. Drug manufacturers pay an effective tax rate of ten
percentage points lower than the average for all major industries.154 These tax breaks
diminish the drug industry’s argument that profits from high drug prices are the
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driving force behind the research and development of new drugs, and that Congress
will chill that research and development by tampering with prices.
The enormous amount of profitability and success of the drug industry is yet
another indicator that lower drug prices will do little to affect the research and
development of new drugs. Currently, drug companies’ profits are greater than those
of any other industry by at least five percent.155 These profits are expected to grow
by 16-18 percent over the next four years.156 This growth rate is about three times
greater than that of the average profit growth rate for any other Fortune 500
company.157 Drug industry revenues have reached a staggering $106 billion dollars
per year.158 These large profit margins have created an enormous amount of
financial security for these companies and their representatives. In 1999, BristolMeyers Squibb paid its CEO a $1.2 million salary, a $1.9 million bonus, and $30.4
million in stock options.159 Such expenditures and large profits should make it
difficult for the U.S. public to believe that high prescription drug prices are necessary
in order for drug companies to prosper and invest more in research and development.
It seems as if their cup is already full.
Furthermore, the drug industry’s search for profitable drugs has had a detrimental
effect on the research and development of less profitable drugs for rare life
threatening diseases. In 1983, Congress recognized this danger and attempted to
stimulate drug development in this area by enacting into law the Orphan Drug Act
(ODA).160 The intent of the Act is to offer an incentive to the pharmaceutical
industry to produce drugs which, without governmental assistance, would be
unprofitable.161
The ODA is applicable upon the FDA’s determination that absent the ODA’s
granting of exclusive rights, and financial assistance, a rare disease would not
receive the attention necessary to produce a cure.162 If such a determination is made
than an exclusive seven-year right to market a drug is necessary to treat the disease
will be granted to a manufacturer willing to research and develop the drug.163 Public
monies through a variety of research grants, tax credits, and other subsidies subsidize
these drugs’ research and development.164 In order to receive these incentives it must
155
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be proven that the disease affects less than 200,000 people.165 While there is no
actual patent granted by the ODA, “the effects of its exclusive right often are
indistinguishable from those of a patent.166 Arguably, the Act suffers from a serious
constitutional defect in that the exclusive rights granted offer the same amount of
protection that a patent offers, yet the patent requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and distinctiveness are not required.167
Regardless of its constitutionality, the ODA is an example of the drug industry’s
exploitation of legislation enacted for the public good, to gain larger profits.
However, in many respects the ODA has been a success. Ten years before it was
enacted, only ten ‘orphan drugs’ that were used to treat rare debilitating diseases
were developed without governmental assistance.168 After ten years as law, 513
drugs were determined to be ‘orphan drugs,’ and the FDA licensed eighty-seven of
those for sale.169 Yet, the drug industry has taken full advantage of the seven-year
exclusive market right by charging extraordinarily high prices for ‘orphan drugs’ that
are almost completely subsidized by public monies.170
The development of drugs for AIDS highlights the industry’s attempt to
manipulate the ODA to gain larger profits. When the epidemic first began, the
reluctance of the drug industry to research and develop in this area was linked to a
lack of potential profit.171 Realizing how beneficial the ODA could be for
profitability, companies, such as Burroughs Wellcome, were able to develop new
drugs, such as AZT, through public funds and subsequently charge an exorbitantly
high price for it due to the seven-year market right granted via the ODA.172
High prices of orphan drugs are an example of pharmaceutical companies taking
advantage of an inherent flaw in the ODA; “Although the act presumes limited
profitability, it does not require that it be demonstrated. Absent that requirement, the
ODA has often been used to increase the marketing advantages of a drug that would
have enjoyed sufficient potential profitability from its patent exclusivity alone.”173
The drug industries manipulation of the ODA is another example of the lengths the
industry will go for profits.
Many drug companies would have Americans believe that the majority of their
profits go towards research and development of new drugs. However, since the FDA
has allowed direct-to-the-consumer advertising campaigns the majority of their
profits have gone towards the marketing of new drugs. The pharmaceutical industry
has decided to gradually shift the core of its spending away from creating new drugs
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and towards the steadier business of marketing them.174 A recent study by the
National Institute for Health Care (NIHC) shows that 25 of the most heavily
advertised drugs accounted for more than 40 percent of the increase in retail drug
spending last year.175 Between 1998 and 1999 the amount of money spent on
consumer advertising increased from $1.3 billion dollars to $1.8 billion dollars.176
The analysis further shows that consumer advertising could be responsible for 1025% of the recent increase in prescription drug prices.177 Just one example of the
enormous amount of advertising spent on a prescription drug is that of the allergy
medication Clariton. Clariton is one of the most heavily advertised drugs in the
U.S..178 In 1999, Schering-Plough, the manufacturer of Clariton, spent over $137
million in advertising the drug.179
Another type of advertising large pharmaceutical companies sink major
investments into are donations made to political groups to increase their lobbying
power. Companies such as Pfizer and Bristol-Myers Squibb lead the pack with totals
of $1,683,433 and $1,648,668, respectively.180 In both cases about 84 percent of
these donations were made to the Republican Party.181
Contrary to what the drug industry would like the American public to believe, the
large profits made from high prescription drug prices are not used to extensively
research and develop new drugs. Rather, the majority of these profits are used for
advertising and lobbying. This is yet another reason why the drug industry’s threat
that research and development will dry up without the high prices charged to
Americans is without merit.
Another excellent indicator that the drug industry’s threat is idle is the success of
past legislative actions that regulate the industry. Congress proposed legislation to
pave the way for a stronger generic drug industry in 1983.182 Under the HatchWaxman Act generic competitors would be allowed to enter the market and compete
with brand-name drugs in a more reasonable fashion.183 Much like the present
scenario, when the Hatch-Waxman Act was proposed, brand-name drug
manufactures claimed that competition from generic drug producers that would
result in lower drug prices would have a significant chilling effect on research and
development of new drugs.184 Ignoring this threat, Congress enacted the Hatch174
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Waxman Act, and the generic drug industry now manufactures nearly fifty percent of
all drugs dispensed in the U.S..185 Yet, even with this increase in competition, the
drug industry’s own estimates of the amount of research and development conducted
increased dramatically.186 The past success of the Hatch-Waxman Act in increasing
competition and lowering prices, while not dampening research and development of
new drugs, should be an excellent indicator that lower drug prices and increased
competition do not necessarily lead to a reduction in new drugs.
XI. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APDA
Lowering the price of prescription drugs is vital to the health and well being of
our nation. These drugs are not luxury items, for which consumers can shop
elsewhere for lower prices.187 Instead, these drugs are a necessity to millions of
Americans who often cannot live without them.188 Strong patent protection of new
essential drugs has allowed many drug companies to acquire a monopoly power over
the market, effectively eliminating any price competition. Thus far, Congress’
“hands off approach” towards prescription drug prices has done nothing to help
reduce these costs.189
With public concern over high drug prices increasing many members of Congress
have been making efforts to make prescription drugs more accessible and affordable
for Americans.190 The APDA was introduced in order to lower drug prices through
competition not price controls.191 The bill states, “[u]nder certain conditions, if a
prescription drug provides a substantial public health benefit and is unreasonably
priced, as determined by the Secretary of Health, the federal government may require
drug manufacturers to license their patent to generic drug companies.”192 This would
allow competitors to market new drugs before patent expiration, while paying the
original inventor royalties for that right.193
By reducing the drug industry’s power and increasing consumer power the
APDA decreases the cost of prescription drug prices by subjecting pharmaceutical
companies to competitive forces. The bill itself is based upon, and draws from,
intellectual property laws already established in the U.S., such as those dealing with
pollution control devices, in which accessibility is an issue.194 The success of these
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programs is an excellent indicator of how effective the APDA will be in making
prescription drugs more accessible and affordable.
Drug companies are in business to maximize profits in order to prosper and
create new drugs. Therefore, it is important not to take away any incentive these
companies have for being innovative and aspiring to be the first to enter the market.
The APDA is a proposal that would do just that by bringing down prices without
taking away the drug companies incentive to act like an industry.195 This balancing
act would be accomplished by the APDA rewarding the patent holder for being the
first to create and market a new drug with the royalties paid to that company.196 Still,
it would, through competitive forces, moderate prices that are too high and make
many life saving drugs more readily available to consumers who need them.197
Furthermore, the APDA allows pharmaceutical companies the option to work
together with the government and avoid a compulsory license by voluntarily
reducing the price to a reasonable amount that would allow the company to profit
from the drug, while still making it more accessible and affordable to the American
public.198
An important policy issue that must be resolved in order for the APDA to be
effective is the determination of what constitutes an essential drug. It is imperative
that a systematic process be established so that the APDA is effective. Many
borderline determinations of essential or non-essential drugs will prove to be less
problematic if a set of criteria to help make these determinations is already in place.
The optimal choice for the APDA is to focus on the guidelines and precedent set by
the WHO and its Eleventh Model List of essential drugs. Using the same criteria as
the WHO is ideal since the original goal of the list parallels that of the APDA’s goal.
This goal is “to advance health equity through expanded access to basic
medicines.”199 More specifically, the WHO has broadly defined essential drugs as
“those that satisfy the health needs of the majority of the population and should
therefore be available at all times in adequate amounts and in appropriate dosage
forms.”200 Using such a broad definition as a basis for developing a more precise set
of criteria to create a systematic process for determining what is an essential drug
will prove to be beneficial to the success of the APDA.
Industry threats that any type of governmental intervention to reduce the price of
drugs would inevitably hinder the research and development of new life-saving drugs
has consistently destroyed any hope of lower prices. While profits from already
existing drugs are vital to the research and development of new drugs, the threat does
not hold true when one examines the underlying facts.
First, the amount of research and development funded by the drug company itself
has been exaggerated to lead many to believe that all of the money spent on research
and development is coming directly from the company. However, in actuality, over
195
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fifty percent of the funding for research and development often comes from public
sources such as the NIH. Furthermore, the government currently provides a major
incentive to drug companies to invest more into research and development through
large tax breaks given to those companies that invest the most. Both of these points
are relevant to show that what small amount of profits that maybe lost due to the
promotion of competition, through the APDA, will in no way have a detrimental
effect on the research and development of new drugs.
Second, the drug industry is one of the most profitable industries in the world. Its
average profit growth rate is three times greater than any other industry and the
industry’s revenues have reached a staggering $106 billion dollars per year. Such
success has resulted in a spoiled and greedy industry, which focuses more on profits
than it does on relieving the pain and suffering of those in need. The profits
currently generated from prescription sales currently show no signs of weakening.
This helps disprove the industry’s argument that government induced competition
would deter any further research and development because of loss of profits.
Third, since the FDA has approved direct-to-the-consumer advertising the
majority of new drug profits go towards advertising expenses rather than towards
research and development. A recent study conducted by the NIHC has revealed that
twenty-five of the most heavily advertised drugs have accounted for more than 40
percent of the increase in retail drug spending.201 These advertising expenditures are
in direct conflict with the drug industry’s argument that a reduction in profits due to
reduced market protection will lead to fewer innovative drugs. Furthermore, the
economic policy of patent protection should not be used to pay for marketing
expenditures, but rather to reinvest into research and development of new drugs.
The drug industry argues that in order to relieve the financial burden of high drug
prices from America’s senior citizens a Medicare modernization or private insurance
enrollment plan would be the most effective measure. More specifically the drug
industry has argued the best way to make drugs more accessible and affordable for
the elderly is “to make prescription drugs affordable for seniors by enrolling all 38
million in private health insurance plans.”202 This argument makes the faulty
assumption that enrollment in private health insurance or expanding Medicare
coverage, alone, will make prescription drugs more accessible and affordable to
senior citizens while allowing prices to remain the same. Enrollment in private
health insurers alone will do little to solve the accessibility and affordability of
prescription drugs especially during a period where private insurers are cutting back
their prescription drug benefits.203 In any event, such an argument represents a
dramatic departure from the industry’s original argument for a free market system.
Such a departure indicates that the bottom line to drug companies is not what
economic theory will make prescription drugs more available to Americans, but
rather what is the most expedient method to increase profits.
Congress is currently debating whether the Medicare program should offer
prescription drug coverage. While amending current Medicare coverage would help
alleviate some of the financial burden on the elderly, without lower prices its long201
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term solvency will be damaged.204 This is not to say that Medicare should not be
expanded to cover prescription drugs, it should; however, this alone will not solve
the problems caused by high drug prices. Expansion of Medicare to provide
prescription drug coverage along with the availability of lower priced drugs provided
via the APDA would allow Medicare the ability to cover senior citizens while not
putting its long-term solvency at risk.
America can no longer stand idly by and allow an already spoiled industry to
regulate prescription drug prices by limiting competition through patent protection.
Congress must not back down from the constant threat that any intrusion or restraints
placed upon the industry will inevitably lead to a reduction in innovative prescription
drugs. The APDA is the optimal implementation plan, which will allow the
government to increase the level of competition in the prescription drug market and
thus reduce prescription drug prices without chilling research and development of
new essential drugs. Governmental assistance has never been more necessary in
order to provide the American public with affordable and accessible drugs.
JOHN D. PINZONE
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